The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline by Wolfram, Charles W.
THE SECOND SET OF PLAYERS:
LAWYERS, FEE SHIFTING, AND THE
LIMITS OF PROFESSIONAL
DISCIPLINE
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM*
I
INTRODUCTION
The "American Rule," although solidly entrenched, has never been able to
boast avid support. The rule insists that a possessor of legal rights should swallow
most of the great expense necessary to vindicate them. It strikes many lay and
professional observers as unjust. Growth of this sentiment has led to significant
judicial and legislative alterations to the American rule. Practitioners of various
social sciences and legal specialties-political science, economics, sociology, legal
history, comparative law, and others-are marshalled in this symposium to
examine the effects and causes of this peculiar American institution and to assess
its alternatives.
Many accounts of the operation of fee-shifting systems proceed by considering
decisions that might be made by plaintiff and defendant on the assumption that a
two-player model adequately describes the principal actors on the fee-shifting or
fee-absorbing stage. These accounts are buttressed by professional standards that
portray a lawyer-client relationship in which the client calls most of the important
shots and the lawyer follows along. Moreover, the lawyer-client fee relationship is
idealized as a matter significantly subject to professional constraints against lawyer
abuses such as disloyalty, dishonesty, and incompetent or corrupted
representation.
A complete analysis of the American rule and suggested alternatives, however,
requires consideration of the likehood that these models and ideals of lawyer con-
duct are incomplete. The lawyer for plaintiff and the lawyer for defendant have
interests that can diverge sharply from the interests of the parties they ideally rep-
resent. Lawyers, in fact, can exert independent control over such actions as filing
suit, settling, and the expenditure of funds, effort, and other critical decisions and
moves in a case. Together, divergent lawyer interest and effective lawyer control
mean that fee-shifting systems that pay insufficient attention to lawyer motivations
and powers can produce surprising and unfortunate consequences.
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This article first examines the lawyer-client relationship from the point of view
of congruent or divergent interests in case outcomes as a function of the lawyer's
compensation gained through fee shifting.1 Second, the article reviews several fee-
shifting settings in which these divergent interests might lead to lawyers sacrificing
their clients' interests or to coercion against lawyers who are conscious of their
professional responsibilities. The focus here is primarily upon the two types of
problems presented by defendants offering opposing lawyers, who are otherwise
entitled to a fee shift, a fee that is similar to either a bribe or an extortion threat.
Next, the article suggests reasons why professional constraints on lawyer behavior,
constraints that ostensibly assure that fee shifting will not lead to lawyer abuses,
probably will not work. The ideals expressed in these professional regulations
remain unrealized in real world settings primarily because of difficulties of enforce-
ment, an absence of adequately motivated enforcers, and process constraints on
disciplinary agency enforcement of standards for lawyer compensation, honesty,
and competence in representing clients. Moreover, it is unlikely that the structure
of disciplinary constraints could be reformed sufficiently to obtain effective
enforcement of norms for sought-after lawyer behavior in many fee-shifting situa-
tions. Therefore, the channeling of lawyer motivation must be accomplished
within the structure of the fee-shifting system itself.
II
LAWYER DIVERGENT INTERESTS AND LAWYER CONTROL
Many current proposals for reform of the American rule seem to proceed on
the assumption that inaugurating radical change in the manner in which lawyer
fees are paid will not significantly affect lawyers' motivations and loyalties. 2 Pro-
fessor Jeffrey O'Connell has recently suggested a legislative or judicial refashioning
of personal injury law that would abandon a plaintiffs award of damages for pain
and suffering in return for mandatory payment of a successful plaintiff's legal fees
by the defendant.3 Professor O'Connell, however, does not discuss the possible
effects such a fee-shifting arrangement would have on the plaintiff's lawyer. Other
studies attempting an economic analysis of fee shifting and related issues have rec-
ognized the problem but have been forced to exclude explicit consideration of
lawyer divergent interests and lawyer control over suit decisions through explicit,
arbitrary assumptions. 4 As necessary as it is to study parts of the world before
synthesizing metaknowledge into more global views, explicit consideration of
lawyer motivation and lawyer control might radically alter one's view of the effi-
cacy of proposed fee-shifting devices.
1. The general phenomenon of distinct, and possibly clashing, client and lawyer motivations in litiga-
tion recently has received deserved attention. Indispensable is the excellent discussion in Johnson, Lamyers'
Choice. A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 567 (1980-81). To
date, the particular problem of lawyer motivation influenced by fee shifting arrangements has not received
attention.
2. Eg.,G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 111-12 (1980).
3. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abohh Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of Claim-
ants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 351.
4. E.g., Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial" A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation
of Legal Costs, I I J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 69 n.50 (1982).
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The chief reason that fee-shifting proposals must take account of lawyer moti-
vation is that lawyers are, among other things, economically motivated agents who
can be expected to react to economic stimuli in ways that probably do not vary
significantly from the responses of nonlawyers. Clearly, factors other than a desire
for fee income may motivate lawyers. Even in the economic realm, fees are not the
only "income" that a lawyer earns in representing a client. A lawyer may also put
value on less tangible economic goods such as the educational value of a case in
teaching the lawyer new skills, its publicity value in attracting other clients to the
lawyer, or its value in enhancing the credibility of the lawyer, for example, by
gaining the lawyer a reputation as a hardnosed negotiator or as a fairminded and
public-spirited individual. 5 These values can be put into the bank and drawn on
in future representations when they will have direct tangible value in producing
higher fees than otherwise would be the case. All of these motivations, while indi-
rect and future-regarding, are palpably rational in economic terms.
Lawyers are also swayed by motives that are not economic in any sense, or are
even inefficient. Only economists' models (and not many economists) comprehend
a world in which all behavior is explained by rational decisions based on calcula-
tions of economic costs and benefits. Some of what goes on in litigation seems
inexplicable in economic terms. One must resort to psychology and kindred sci-
ences to explain "crazy" economic behavior such as the pathological litigator, the
absurdly uneconomic refusal of some high executives in large corporations to tes-
tify, and the inability of some lawyers to be prepared sufficiently for litigation.
Until economists develop convincing explanations for such profound influences as
the impact of alcohol and drugs on lawyer decisions, more than simply economic
motivations must be considered because economic motivations provide only par-
tial explanations. Therefore, such considerations as altruism, a personal sense of
integrity, an ideologically inspired desire to right certain wrongs, a shared sense of
affinity to traditional professional role models honored within the legal profession,
and similar influences are detectable behind lawyer attitudes and lawyer decisions
on behalf of their clients.
Accepting the above, however, it remains true that most lawyers regard them-
selves as entrepreneurs and largely act accordingly. These lawyers regard what
they are doing as earning a living or better. If a step on behalf of a client causes a
decrease in the lawyer's income, this move predictably is regretted and, often, the
lawyer attempts to avoid or frustrate such an action. If a step in litigation will
increase income, then the average lawyer naturally is under an inducement to take
such action and altruistic constraints, at best, will be in contention for the lawyer's
loyalty but may not prevail. Consequently, the only apparent restraint on the
lawyer's economic self-interest is client control over important moves in the repre-
sentation. It might be believed that clients can regularly prevent their lawyers
from taking steps that are not in the clients' interests but rather are dictated by
lawyer self-interest in obtaining fees under fee-shifting arrangements. Client con-
5. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 580-82.
Page 293: Winter 1984
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
trol, however, probably does not work effectively and, actually, is unlikely to occur
in fee-shifting situations.
The professional model, to be sure, is one of effective and informed client con-
trol. The professional ideal is that lawyers will continually keep their clients
informed of important developments in the litigation,6 inform them of relevant
legal and nonlegal factors that bear upon upcoming moves,7 and abide by client
decisions with respect to all important aspects of the case.8 If the interests of the
client and lawyer diverge in any material way, the lawyer is under a professional
obligation to proceed no further unless the client, after being fully informed, con-
sents. 9 These professional obligations are undergirded by obligations of total loy-
alty to a client and dedication of both intense interest and considerable skill to the
client's objectives. 10
The professional model, however, might be a tapestry of professional
mythology. Many parts of the model are revealed as fictive by scholars who define
a very different picture in many areas of representation and as courts themselves
make inroads. Scholars who study the legal profession have been reporting for
some time that lawyers regularly depart from the professional model of client con-
trol and make critical decisions on their own in both criminal 1 and civil represen-
6. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
CODE]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (Aug. 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983
MODEL RULES]. The Model Code has been adopted verbatim or to a substantial extent as the professional
regulatory rules for lawyers in most jurisdictions. The "EC" citation identifies an aspirational guide while
"DR" identifies a rule which is mandatory and for violation of which a lawyer may be disciplined. See
MODEL CODE, supra, Preliminary Statement.
The Model Rules were adopted by the ABA, in August 1983, to replace the Model Code. They will not
be effective unless adopted in individual jurisdictions.
7. MODEL CODE, supra note 6, EC 7-8 (,1983); 1983 MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rules 1.2(a), 1.4(b).
8. MODEL CODE, supra note 6, EC 7-7 ("In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the
merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions
on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client."); see, e.g.,
Wilder v. Third Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 219 Va. 175, 179, 247 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1978) (decision
whether to pursue judgment against defendant that lawyer thinks is judgment-proof is one to be made
solely by client); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 6, EC 7-8; cf 1983 MODEL RULES, supra note 6, DR 7-
101(A)-(1). Attempts are sometimes made to draw distinctions between tactical and strategic decision-
making, with problematic results. E.g., Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel" A
Judge's Viewpoit, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 51 (1966); Roscoe Pound-Am. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Final
Report: Ethics and Advocacy 14-16 (1978).
The ABA's Model Rules take a twofold approach: "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions con-
cerning the objectives of representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they
are to be pursued." 1983 MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.2(a).
9. MODEL CODE, supra note 6, EC 5-3 (1981).
10. Id. EC 5-1, 7-1; 1983 MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rules 1.3, 1.7.
11. The picture in criminal defense representation is one of rather complete lawyer domination even
of such critical decisions as whether to plead guilty. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,
84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1306 (1975) (interviews reveal that normal defense counsel attitude is that client-
accused must accept bargain negotiated by lawyer or find new representation); Blumberg, The Practice of
Law as a Confidence Game. Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 15, 24-28 (1967)
(lawyer manipulation of client accused in order to justify fee while maximizing lawyer profit). See Skol-
nick, Social Control in the Adversaiy System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 52, 65 (1967) (in the lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer usually regards himself as the "player").
Lawyers occasionally candidly reject, at least implicitly, the professional model of client control. Eg.,
Nadjari, Panel Discussion: Professional Responsibility in the Practice of Criminal Law, The Murky Divide Between
Right and Wrong, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER 58 (N. Galston ed. 1977) ("It's . . .
self-evident to me that capable attorneys control their [criminal] clients.").
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tations. 12 The studies indicate that many lawyers give little deference to clients on
such critical matters as when to settle a case and how vigorously to contest it.13
The sources of lawyer power in the relationship are many and complex, but chiefly
consist of information monopolies, better access to levers of effective power such as
judges and court officials, and skill in negotiating with clients through threats, dire
forecasts of probable alternative outcomes, and similar psychological pressures. 14
Much lawyer departure from the professional model of lawyer submission to
client control occurs because of the fee incentives under which lawyers work. The
same deviations from the model can occur in lawyer payment systems that involve
no fee shifting. For example, the hourly rate method of compensating a lawyer
provides a lawyer with an incentive to prolong litigation in order to churn out
hours and fee claims against the client. 15 Studies of the operation of such fee-
shifting devices as the contingent fee 16 and the "lodestar" system of awarding fees
when courts have been empowered to make such awards under exceptions to the
American rule 17 offer powerful reasons for concluding that lawyer motivation
comes under strong and corrupting influence due to the prospect of winning or
increasing a fee award.
12. A high degree of effective lawyer control is probably present in many noncriminal situations when
the client is economically weak, the precise situation in which many fee-shifting proposals seek to enhance
the client's litigating posture by funding his lawyer. Eg., D. ROSENTHAL, LAXViER AND CLIENT: WHO'S
IN CHARGE? (1974) (personal injury plaintiffs); Hostika, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care
About What Is Going to Happen.- Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reahty, 26 Soc. PROBS. 599 (1979) (legal service
clients); Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAw & Soc'V' REV. 115, 128, 159-60 (1979)
(consumer clients).
Lawyer domination in noncriminal cases can take extreme forms of attempted autocratic control. By
way of possible illustration, in People ex re, Attorney Gen. v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553, 556, 27 N.E. 1096, 1099
(1891), the court quoted the following from a letter to a disgruntled client by a lawyer who was disbarred
for suborning perjury of other witnesses:
If you are here on Saturday next, you will have your [divorce] decree. If you are not here, it is no fault
of mine. However, it may be as well to understand that I never suffer any scolding or dictation from
my clients. I know better how to conduct their cases than they do, and I conduct my cases my own
way.
13. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 12; Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyer-Chent
Deci ion Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 1003, 1003 n.3.
14. See generally authorities cited supra notes 11-12; E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE (1970);
Mazor, Power and Responsibilty in the Attorney-Chent Relatinship, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1120 (1968).
15. See, for example, Rosenblatt v. Ocean Controls Corp., 188 N.Y.L.J. 17 (1982), in which a fine of
$400 was levied against a defendant's lawyer for a frivolous argument made in oppostion to a routine
motion. The court held that the fine was to be paid by the offending lawyer unless the court's inclination
to find bad faith could be rebutted on a further hearing. Among other things, the court suggested that a
finding of no bad faith could be readily supported if it developed that the offending lawyer's fee agreement
with his client did not call for an hourly fee charge.
16. The principal studies are Mitchell & Schwartz, Theoretical Implcations of Contingent Legal Fees, 12 Q.
REV. ECON. & Bus. 69 (1972); Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal
Inuiy Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970); and Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contigent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 529 (1978). Some scholars nonetheless do assume strong client control of decisions in
contingent fee settings, regardless of the impact of client decisions on lawyer income. Such an assumption,
for example, must underlie arguments that the contingent fee contract promotes unwanted litigation
because it encourages speculative, frivolous, or otherwise nonmeritorious cases with a low probability of a
large payoff. See Halpern & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Legal Fees Contracts, in LAvviYERS AND THE
CONSUMER INTEREST: REGULATING THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES 161 (1982).
17. See Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981).
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To some extent, courts have worked independent lawyer motivation and out-
come control into the fabric of accepted procedure. This incorporation has
occurred in the important area of class actions where settlements are subject to
judicial approval and disapproval."' Federal courts have recently held: (1) that a
settlement proposal supported by class counsel could be approved by the court
despite the fact that the named class representative vehemently opposed it;19 (2)
that a class action settlement supported by the class representative could be
approved by the court even though it was opposed by class counsel;20 and (3) that
a fee-shifting statute provided a right to recover a fee on the part of the lawyer so
that a client's private settlement of an action could not deprive the lawyer of his
right to recover the fee. 2 1 Only the second of these holdings comports with the
traditional view that clients, and not their lawyers, control the effective disposition
of the case 22 and that clients are the source to which lawyers normally should look
for the payment of their fees. 23 The holdings portray an entirely radical regime in
which effective control over the disposition of class actions has shifted, clearly to
the judge and arguably to the defendant, who to an extent can play one player
(the lawyer or the client class representative) off against the other. The
defendant's ability to take advantage of the situation is impaired to some extent by
rules prohibiting direct communication between the defendant's lawyer or the
defendant and the opposing party.2 4 But if these communication barriers can be
overcome, then the plaintiff's lawyer has lost some part of the advice-giving influ-
ence over the client that the traditional model also assumed.25 Perhaps of even
greater importance, the former power that a client could wield over his or her
lawyer because of client control over fee payment has been almost entirely stripped
away in many fee-shifting situations. As a result, the way is open for direct negoti-
ations between the plaintiff's lawyer and the defense, and their resulting agree-
ments can be presented to the court for approval despite the objections of the only
person who-if we adhere to the formalities of class actions 26-is empowered to
bring the action in the first place.
The apparent justification for this loosened client control-and arguably an
adequate substitute for it-is the greatly enlarged role of the presiding judge. The
judge can effectively veto a proposed settlement if not persuaded that it is in the
best interests of the larger community of persons and interests affected by it,
including those who are objecting, presumably misguidedly. Whether judges can
18. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (class action "dismissal or compromise" subject to judicial approval
after notice to class); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (derivative actions). The federal procedural rules on class
actions have been widely followed in state court procedural rules. See I H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS
§ 1220, at 294 (1977 & Supp. 1978).
19. E.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982); McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee
Corp., 565 F.2d 416, 426 (7th Cir. 1977); Saylor v. Lindsey, 456 F.2d 896, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1972).
20. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 377 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (dicta).
21. See James v. Home Constr. Co., 689 F.2d 1357 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
22. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
23. Cf MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR 5-107(A)(1).
24. Id DR 7-104(A); 1983 MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 4.2.
25. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
26. The logic, rather than the formality, of class action law suggests that it might do in some instances
to permit lawyers to bring class actions without an initial client. See Kalven & Rosenfeld, The ContenporaO)
Function of the Class Sutt, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 718 n.98 (1941).
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play or in fact do play such a large role may be seriously doubted. Certainly, the
high unlikelihood that a judge will veto a proposed plan of settlement suggests that
the judicial veto is reserved only for the most blatant ripoff of a class. 27
Similar judicial erosion of the client-control model is visible in related doctrinal
developments concerning fee awards outside the class action area. Courts tend
toward a view that a fee award under a fee-shifting statute is not subject to the
control of the lawyer's client but, in some sense at least, "belongs " to the lawyer.
Thus, a fee award to the lawyer for a prevailing party cannot be subjected to setoff
against the plaintiffs indebtedness to the defendant on a counterclaim.2 8 A lawyer
denied a fee application has standing to appeal. 29 Further, when a settlement is
achieved behind the plaintiffs lawyer's back by a Truth-in-Lending defendant, the
plaintiff cannot preclude the lawyer from later asserting a claim for fees under the
fee-shifting provisions of the statute. 30
These developments are explicable on the ground that the policy objectives of
fee-shifting arrangements will be frustrated if lawyers are given less control and
management of the fee question. But it should also be apparent that the loosening
or removal of client control over the purse strings that regulate the flow of income
to the lawyer creates the risk that the lawyer might engage in unwanted, harmful
conduct.
III
THE Prandnit Solution
If one accepts that real-world lawyers, either deviantly or with judicial encour-
agement in some areas, are functioning independently of client control with
respect to significant moves in litigation, what specific threats does this portend to
the goals sought to be achieved through fee shifting?3t And to what extent might
fee shifting exacerbate existing temptations for lawyers to engage in unwanted
behavior? A prominent illustration of ways in which fee-shifting objectives can be
frustrated by the fee-benefited lawyer is portrayed by the Prandniv. National Tea
Co. 32 decision, which has become well-known and controversial 33 for its rule that
27. Statistics on judicially rejected settlements seem not to exist. This view is an impressionistic one
gained from following class actions and from an inability to find very many reported cases in which a
settlement was rejected by a judge. The absence of reports does not mean that judges have not much less
formally-but equally effectively-signalled to negotiating lawyers that an acceptable settlement must
provide greater relief to the class than that being discussed or tentatively proposed. Class actions are typi-
fied by a great deal of off-the-record chambers conferences that make chronicling their course from printed
records a very chancy business.
28. E.g., Plant v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979); General Inv., Inc. v. Thomas,
422 So. 2d 1279 (La. App. 1982).
29. Lipscomb v. Wise, 643 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981).
30. James v. Home Constr. Co., 689 F.2d 1357 (1 1th Cir. 1982). The rationale of the court is quite
germane. The court emphasized that fee awards were a "critical and integral" part of the congressional
scheme of private attorney general enforcement under the Federal Truth in Lending Act, that relatively
indigent clients had no economic incentive not to accede to attractive offers to bargain away their lawyer's
fee-award claim, and that lenders should not be able to readily evade the private enforcement and reme-
dial schemes of the legislation.
3 1. These goals have been catalogued and analyzed in Rowe, The Legal Theo'
, 
of Attorne) Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overvlew, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651.
32. 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
33. Some courts have rejected I'randin,. E.g., Folsom v. Butte County Ass'n of Gov'ts, 32 Cal. 3d 668,
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in actions involving a court-awarded fee the lawyers are not to negotiate or discuss
the fee award as part of settlement discussions. These negotiations may take place
only after the court approves the damage settlement.
3 4
Prandi'n is often thought of as one problem, but in fact it is two. The com-
monly discussed concern is that portrayed in Prandini itself: that the lawyer for the
plaintiff might have been induced to support a very low settlement offer because of
its generous fee allowance, 35 a "sweetheart contract" for the lawyer but not the
client.3 6 Prandni-sweetheart offers are made more often in plaintiff class actions,
with greater discounts applied to the portion of the settlement that would go to the
plaintiff class, because of the rule that a settlement supported by the class lawyer
can be approved by the court notwithstanding objections from the class mem-
bers.37 Sweetheart offers can also be employed when the client retains ultimate
power to accept or reject any settlement offer-for example, in an individual
damage suit for sex discrimination in employment-but there it would be neces-
sary to keep the client uninformed or otherwise mollified about the relatively small
size of his or her portion of the proposed settlement.
The second and less-discussed variation on the Prandzin problem is the result of
reverse leverage applied by the defendant; instead of a generous offer to the lawyer
and a paltry one to the client, the defense offers generous terms to the client and
681, 652 P.2d 437, 446, 186 Cal. Rptr. 589, 598 (1982); see also A. MILLER, ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS
ACTIONS 222-23 (1980) (criticisms of Arandini*, but poll of federal judges and practitioners shows wide sup-
port for rule).
34. See Prandin', 557 F.2d at 1021 (3d Cir. 1977). A controversial provision of the Corporate Govern-
ance project of the American Law Institute would make Prandini the mandatory practice in shareholder
litigation. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 7.07(b) (Tent. Draft no. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE]: "Until such time as the court having jurisdiction over the action has approved a proposed
settlement, none of the parties, their attorneys or agents shall enter into any agreement, negotiation or
discussion concerning allowable plaintiff's fees or expenses with an opposing party in the action .... "
Some courts have accepted Prandini as a general rule, but have approved settlements negotiated in
violation of the fee-discussion prohibition because of independent guarantees that the class' interests likely
were not compromised as a consequence of the class lawyer's interest in receiving a large fee award. E.g.,
Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980) (intervention of Department ofJustice on behalf
of plaintiff class protected the class from lawyer's possible conflict because of simultaneously negotiated fee
award), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
35. It is well documented in other contexts that lawyers and their clients may have radically different
incentives when presented with a settlement offer. For the lawyer, the chance to obtain a "quick kill" and
a sure fee might be very tempting, while a well-advised client would view the settlement without a similar
degree of enthusiasm or anxiety. See Dam, Class Actons: Effciency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of
Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 57 (1975) (class actions); Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 16 (contingent
fees). The point being made here assumes that risk-neutral and well-informed lawyers and clients would
regard the lawyer's fee award and the client's substantive relief offered in the settlement as grossly
disproportional.
36. See Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1021. The "sweetheart contract" problem has been recognized by many
courts, although not always by the "sweetheart" appellation applied in Prandin itself. E.g., Obin v. Dis-
trict No. 9, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 582 (8th Cir. 1981); Mendoza v.
United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352-59 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Pettway v. Amer-
ican Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1216 n.71 (5th Cir. 1978) (dicta), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979);
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451
(E.D. Ill. 1978).
37. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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little or nothing to the lawyer.38 A fillip that can make the offer sting more is to
condition the offer expressly on the lawyer's explicit agreement to accept a low or
no fee.3 9 Fee leverage thus can operate in the hands of the defendant either as a
bribe or as extortion, referred to herein as Prandim'-sweetheart offers and Prandim'-
extortion offers.
These distorting devices occur in different settings and involve different lawyer
motivations, although they share salient features and perhaps can be dealt with
through the same judicial or legislative approach. Prandini-sweetheart offers
involve lawyer motivation to support a settlement that an "objective" lawyer
would urge a client to reject. A Prandni'-extortion offer puts pressure on the lawyer
to oppose a settlement that is quite generous to the lawyer's client but which offers
a fee award that an "objective" lawyer would regard as inadequate.
These devices share at least two characteristics. First, to the extent that they
are effective, it is because of the divergent economic interests of client and lawyer.
Each is motivated to contend against the other, or at least to neglect the interests
of the other, in order to maximize his or her own gain. Second, the "net" result is
probably dysfunctional to important purposes of fee shifting, at least in the long
run. In the short run, if one focuses solely on the individual settlement, full restitu-
tion and deterrent impact 40 might be imposed on the defendant because of the
enhanced damage award or lawyer fee award that defendant must offer in order to
obtain the desired leverage. The size of the premium depends on such variable
matters as the relative risk aversion of lawyer and client, the relative amounts and
kinds of information and advice that each is receiving, and the extent to which
judicial approval of the settlement, if required, or other external regulation takes
an active or passive form. In the long run, however, the defendant, particularly if
the practice can be resorted to predictably in the future, can "buy out" of the
statutory and judicial protections and policies that fee shifting and the substantive
law underlying the plaintiffs claim are designed to enforce.
Prandini-sweetheart settlements, if permitted, involve defendants buying out
plaintiff's lawyers with the effect of defeating full recovery for victims and full
deterrence of the illegal activity that gave rise to the lawsuit in the first place.
Prandini-extortion settlements, if permitted, provide predictably strong disincen-
tives to lawyers and others to enter into future litigation in which Prandnmi-extor-
tion offers can be made. Ultimately, the fee shifting provided in federal civil rights
cases, for example, will be defeated to the extent that it was designed to encourage
38. Reportedly, these offers are made with great regularity in civil rights and civil liberties litigation.
See Levin, Practical, Ethical and Legal Considerations Involved in the Settlement of Cases in Which Statutory Attorney's
Fees Are Authortze 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 515, 515 n.7 (1980) ("Virtually every legal services attorney
involved in consumer cases has been confronted with such offers."); Fee Waiver Requests Unethicaz Bar
Optnion, 68 A.B.A.J. 23 (1982) (staff counsel to American Civil Liberties Union estimates that more than
half of civil rights cases litigated see such offers). A reported case apparently involving such an offer is
Krause v. Rhodes, 640 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981). The court in Krause
approved a settlement offer that was conditioned on a very low attorney fee award, apparently on the sui
generis ground that this deeply divisive litigation arising out of the tragic Kent State killings by members of
the National Guard should be put to rest.
39. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV:. 1183, 1207 (1982).
40. See Rowe, supra note 31, at 660-61.
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lawyers to champion cases involving civil rights claims. 4 1 In quite different ways,
both Prandini-sweetheart and Prandini-extortion offers have this policy-nullifying
effect.
IV
OTHER UNWANTED LAWYER CONDUCT
Before turning to a consideration of the way that the organized bar has
responded to the professional problems presented by Prandini offers, it is advisable
to expand our scope to examine, briefly, other types of unwanted lawyer conduct
that can be motivated by forms of fee shifting. Indeed, Prandini -type problems may
not be the abuses most disruptive of the goals of fee-shifting arrangements.
Lawyer fraud might be a more costly abuse across the entire sweep of cases in
which the law provides for fee shifting. Fee shifting in many of its forms presents
opportunities for lawyer self-advancement through misreporting of effort. Under
the widely employed "lodestar" method of computing a fee award, based largely
on the number of billable attorney hours, lawyers are under strong economic pres-
sure to work slowly or to perform work that is unnecessary. 42 Beyond gold-
bricking, outright falsification of hours is suspected. 4 3 Unless the attempt is
blundered, these fabrications are difficult to detect because hours worked is a
matter of self-reporting and is not subject to effective verification. 44 In addition,
other bases for the fee can be falsified. Lawyers whose previous clients have been
limited largely to those normally requiring low-paying work, such as personal
injury and misdemeanor representations, make claims in fee-shifting cases that
their "normal" hourly charge is $150 or more. (At the least, one may wonder why
lawyers with such prosperous practices leave them and pursue fee-shift cases that
hold the risk of no fee; pursuit of the public interest surely does not explain all the
instances.) Sometimes, possible frauds are ignored because the fee will be paid out
of a settlement pot in which no party capable of mounting an attack on the fee is
41. See id. at 663.
42. E.g., A. MILLER, supra note 33, at 270-71 (1980); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General- Why
the Model ofthe Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 247 (1983); see also In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Lit. 98 F.R.D. 48, 68, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ($20,200,000 in requested legal fees reduced
nearly $16,000,000: "These fee petitions are grossly excessive on their face ... I regret to say that my
inquiry has given substance to the worst fears of the critics of the class action device-that it is being
manipulated by lawyers to generate fees.").
43. E.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Lit., 98 F.R.D. 48, 172, 177-78 (E.D. Pa. 1983); A. MILLER, supra
note 33, at 275-76 (one-third of surveyed judges and lawyers believed that inflating timesheets was common
practice).
44. The dogged pursuit of the question of falsified hours in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Lit., 98 F.R.D.
48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), seems to be sui generis. After class lawyers filed fee requests for almost 40% of the
preinterest class recovery, several large corporate class members hired a New York law firm to investigate
and resist fee claims. A fratricidal dispute broke out among the plaintiffs' lawyers about fee shares, causing
several lawyers to expose irregularities of others. See Bruck, Harold Kohn Against the World, AM. LAW., Jan.
1982, at 28; Bruck, Reading Moody's for 1682 An Hour, AM. LAw., Jan. 1982, at 31. The presiding judge held
hearings that consumed four months and eventually issued a 189-page opinion. The circumstances suggest
that detection of the falsification could readily have been avoided by a more efficient and nonpublic nego-
tiation of intraclass leadership and fee disputes, a development which seems predictable in many future
cases. The commitment of resources by class members and courts to the question of the size of fees also
seems atypical although, given the magnitude of the amounts at stake, not at all inappropriate.
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present in court to do so.4 5
Fee-splitting and kindred practices probably are rather widely engaged in by
plaintiff's lawyers in certain clientless litigation such as class actions for damages in
which the "fund theory" will be invoked for an award of fees. Related practices
include rather blatant and self-interested "brokering" of power positions in one
case in return for power in another-always with a larger share of the fee award
ultimately in view. 46
American professional standards also carry implications for two-way fee
shifting. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) provides that a
lawyer advising a client to disobey a discovery order can, in the court's discretion,
be ordered to pay an attorney fee to the opposing party. 47 For some time, appli-
cable professional standards have prohibited a lawyer from advancing or guaran-
teeing financial assistance to a client in connection with contemplated or pending
litigation. 48 It appears that a court-imposed obligation to pay the legal fees of an
aggrieved opposing party would not constitute a violation of these professional
rules. But that hardly exhausts the subject.
Quite conceivably, a lawyer might recommend a course of action with the
assurance to a client that any penalties that might befall him would be paid by the
lawyer. Even in the absence of such an explicit understanding, the purpose of the
professional standards may be compromised to some extent by the judicial power
to impose fee costs on a lawyer. The major purpose behind the prohibition against
cost advancement is rooted in the common law prohibitions against such litiga-
tion-supporting maneuvers as champerty, barratry, and maintenance. The
modern expression of purpose is that a lawyer's advancement of costs to a client
puts the lawyer in the position of one who has an undue economic investment in
the outcome of the litigation. This interest, it is feared, will impair the professional
detachment of the lawyer.49 A similar impairment may occur when a lawyer is
ordered to pay the fees of an opposing party. Nonetheless, the goals sought to be
served by punitive assessments of fee costs for bad faith litigation probably cannot
be achieved without incurring some possibility of conflict of interest. On the other
hand, the lawyer abuses involved in such practices as the Prandim'-sweetheart and
Prandini-extortion settlements apparently require regulation.
45. The peculiar arrangements of typical "fund" theory fee shifting leave a defendant devoid of any
interest in the distribution of a settlement fund once it has been accepted by the court. Often, the claim-
ants against the fund are too numerous and too uninformed and have claims too small to permit effective
scrutiny of the size of the lawyer fees that consume a large part of their fund before they see its remnants.
See A. MILLER, supra note 33, at 204; Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients. Attorney Fees from Funds, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1597 (1974).
46. Coffee, supra note 42, at 59, 61.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). The Federal Rules were amended in 1983 to extend considerably the
power of federal judges to impose fee-paying obligations on lawyers who take or advise clients to take
certain unwanted steps in litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16(0, 2 6 (g) (amended 1983).
48. This sentence is a paraphrase of the MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR 5-103(B). Compare 1983
MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.8(e).
49. See 1983 MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.8(e), comment.
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V
LAWYER CODES AND FEE SHIFTING ABUSES
A well-tempered reflex of lawyers and judges confronted with an instance of
lawyer misfeasance is to apply or create professional standards enforceable through
agencies of professional discipline. Therefore, one might inquire whether Prandini-
sweetheart offers or Prandini-extortion offers or other lawyer behavior influenced
by fee shifting raise problems under the lawyer disciplinary codes. The answer is
that professional regulations bear rather plentifully, and disapprovingly, on many
of the problems discussed but only debatably on others.
The Prandi'ni-sweetheart dealing is an ethical sitting duck. It plainly falls under
those provisions of the lawyers' rules which proscribe disloyalty to a client 50 and
engaging in activity that creates an impermissible conflict of interest without the
informed consent of the client. 5' The conflict of interest is created because the
plaintiff's lawyer's temptation to receive a large fee creates strong economic pres-
sure not to assure that the client receives the maximum possible settlement award.
This, in turn, creates pressures for the lawyer not to inform the client fully and
fairly about the alternatives to acceptance of the settlement.5 2 The disparities
between the lawyer's proposed fee and the client's proposed award might be so
great that the conflict becomes "nonconsentable" and cannot be cured even
through client consent. 53 More problematically, the defendant's lawyer may be in
50. MODEL CODE, supra note 6, EC 5-1; 1983 MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.7, comment.
51. MODEL CODE,supra note 6, DR 7-101(A)(1) ("A lawyer should not intentionally ... fail to seek
the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means .... "); 1983 MODEL RULES, supra
note 6, Rules 1.7, 1.8. Also apparently implicated is MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR 7-107(B) ("A lawyer
shall not permit a person who pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his profes-
sional judgment in rendering such legal services."). Cf, e.g., Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d
1085 (3d Cir. 1976) (lawyer for the class may not be named as the class representative because of fee-
generated conflict), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Munoz v. Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 671 (D.
Ariz. 1978) (lawyer who sought to negotiate his fee simultaneously with the merits would not be adequate
counsel for the class); Note, Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest zn the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1244, 1454 (1981).
52. The legal profession's method for dealing with conflicts of interest calls for a lawyer to recognize
conflict-of-interest situations at the outset, requires that the lawyer not proceed with the representation
once a serious conflict has been detected unless the client consents, and threatens professional discipline
(ranging from private reprimand to disbarment) for failure to comply with either of the preceding two
steps. Clearly, this arrangement is not fully protective of the client in the context of either form of the
Prandti problem. In Prandim'-sweetheart situations, an important economic control that a client usually
can exert over a lawyer with divergent interests is missing precisely because the lawyer is looking to a third
party, and not to the client, for fee payment. Moreover, it is just at the moment when the client wishes to
have dispassionate and objective advice about the nature, extent, and possible consequences of the lawyer's
conflict of interest and about the adequacy of the settlement offer that the lawyer is staggering under the
weight of a very generous fee allowance offer. Driven by conflicting interests in professional integrity and a
desire for handsome remuneration, the lawyer is in a poor position to recognize the extent of the conflict
and give the client full and adequate advice about how to assess the lawyer's advice in light of that conflict.
Finally, in many Prandim situations, the "client" is a nominal party in a class action and has little economic
or other incentive to control the lawyer's behavior. E.g., Rhode, supra note 39, at 1212-15.
53. The concept of the nonconsentable conflict is an emerging one. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly recognizes it only in the context of simultaneously representing clients with adverse
interests. MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR 5-105(C) (in conflict of interest representations, client consent
can be given only "if it is obvious that [the lawyer] can adequately represent" the interests of each client
and each client consents after full disclosure); e.g., Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 794 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (former government lawyer conflict not cured by former client's consent when conflict is "flagrant");
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violation of professional rules for inducing another lawyer to act disloyally to his or
her client.
54
The permissibility of Prandini-extortion offers is primarily a question of the
behavior of the defendant's lawyer. The defense lawyer seeks to gain an advantage
by conditioning a favorable settlement on the adversary lawyer's fee waiver. The
gambit will be succesful only if the opposing lawyer resists the economic tempta-
tion created by the offer to advise the client unwisely to reject the settlement.
According to an ethics opinion of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, a defense lawyer in a case involving a civil rights or civil liberties claim
commits a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility if he exacts or enters
into discussions about a Prandzi-extortion settlement offer.55 The committee's
rationale is that Prandnt-extortion offers seriously impinge on the policies behind
civil rights statutes providing fee awards-those policies of providing compensa-
tion to victims of discriminatory conduct and of deterring its repetition. 56
Although the opinion repeatedly stresses that it is limited to fee shifting in civil
rights and civil liberties cases,57 its reasoning may not be so easily cabined; the
policy of providing counsel to those unable to afford suit if not benefited by fee
shifting underlies many important statutes not related to civil rights and civil
liberties.
The City Bar opinion can be questioned from several points of view, but one
criticism seems particularly telling. The fundamental anomaly in the committee's
In re Mercer, 133 Ariz. 391, 394, 652 P.2d 130, 133 (1982) (lawyer disbarred for providing legal services to
client in client's sale of property to partnership in which lawyer was general partner; client's alleged con-
sent was unavailing because conflict was nonconsentable). The ABA's 1983 Model Rules limit all conflict-
type consents to situations in which a lawyer reasonably believes that the client's interests will not be
"adversely affected." 1983 MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.7(b)(1).
54. The situation is closely analogous to the crime of bribery, and the conduct of the defendant's
lawyer lacks only the element of inducing an act by a public official to bring it squarely within laws
proscribing offering a bribe. The conduct would seem to fit more comfortably within the commercial
bribery concept accepted in some jurisdictions. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES
§ 10.6, at 701 n.8 (1973); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 224.8(1)(c), 224.8(2) (1980) (lawyer commits
misdemeanor if "he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating
or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to which he is subject"; person who makes offer similarly liable).
Even if not criminal, the attempt to bribe an agent falls afoul of common-law agency rules. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958).
55. Op. 80-94, 36 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 507 (1981). The opinion was resisted by a "substantial
minority" of the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics. Id. at 510. The rationale of the majority
is quite puzzling in several respects. (1) To the extent that the opinion is based on MODEL CODE, supra
note 6, DR I-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice") and id EC 2-25 ("Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet [the] need for legal
services [on the part of those unable to pay reasonable fees]."), would it be unethical for a lawyer to
advocate a limiting construction of a fee-award statute or to urge its repeal? (2) Is the opinion limited to
plaintiff's lawyers who operate out of "public interest organizations"? See Op. 80-94, 36 REC. A.B. CITY
N.Y. 507, 508 (1981). (3) Why is the "public policy" rationale limited to cases in which fee shifting is
provided in actions involving civil rights and civil liberties instead of being generally applicable to fee
shifting statutes involving otherwise indigent claimants? (4) Are "fair" fee awards the proper subject of
presettlement discussions?
56. Op. 80-94 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 507, 510 (1981): "[T]he long term effect of persistent demands for
the waiver of statutory fees is to prejudice a vital aspect of the administration of justice and undermine
efforts to make counsel available to those who cannot afford it, contrary to the obligations and aspirations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
57. Id at 507, 508, 509, 511, 512 n.4.
Page 293: Winter 1984
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
reasoning is that it treats as "unethical" conduct on the part of a lawyer which,
from all that appears in the opinion, is perfectly legal for the client (the defendant)
to pursue independently.58
This anomalous approach is not an isolated one, although it is found more
frequently in the rarefied atmosphere of ethics opinions than in other concrete
materials such as judicial opinions.5 9 Its functional defect is that a defense lawyer
who feels compelled to follow the dictate of the City Bar opinion can readily frus-
trate its "public policy" objectives by advising his or her client that a lawyerless
negotiation with the plaintiff--or with the plaintiffs lawyer-could legally be
conducted by a defendant or by any defendant's agents other than a lawyer and
that one condition that could be insisted upon is a fee waiver by plaintiffs lawyer.
If this analysis is valid, then the City Bar opinion rather pointlessly insists that a
lawyer as agent may not do for a client what a client legally is entitled to accom-
plish without a lawyer's assistance.
The problem of imposing regulations upon lawyers, but not similarly con-
straining clients without lawyers, is a large and unsatisfactorily resolved one.
Ethics opinions too often rest seemingly upon an entirely subjective view of gen-
tility and good breeding or, equally dangerously, upon the "appearances of impro-
priety" that require lawyers to take-or, much more commonly, to refuse to
take-otherwise lawful steps on behalf of a client. 61 The unrealistic client-abne-
gating conduct that is called for in these opinions makes it highly unlikely that
58. A related, but different, objection is alluded to in the opinion. "The minority also urges that the
ethical rule the Committee announces affects not only defense lawyers, but the defendants themselves-
who are deprived of an opportunity to have their counsel seek a certain type of settlement which would
limit the defendants' exposure." Id. at 511. The majority's response is that the same thing happens under
another provision of the MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR 2-108(B), prohibiting settlements in which the
lawyer agrees not to bring on behalf of other plaintiffs suits similar to the one being settled.
59. Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Cr
tique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 67 (1981).
60. Direct negotiation between defense counsel and plaintiff would, of course, be impermissible
without consent of plaintiffs lawyer. MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR 7-104(A)(1). 1983 MODEL RULES,
supra note 6, Rule 4.2. Defense counsel is prohibited by language in this Disciplinary Rule from "caus[ing]
another to communicate" with plaintiff, but this Rule probably does not preclude advice (without encour-
agement) that the defendant is entitled to make a direct approach to the plaintiff. In any event, the
Prandm -extortion approach by defendant could be made directly to the plaintiff's lawyer. Defense counsel
would, obviously, consent to the direct negotiation.
61. Notorious examples include the Watergate bugging opinion of the American Bar Association
ethics committee. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974). This
opinion stated that a lawyer could not "ethically" make a secret tape recording of a conversation with
another person, including a nonparty witness, without that person's full consent after disclosure. From all
that appears in Opinion 337, it would be unethical for a lawyer to make a tape recording of a terrorist's
threat against a client unless the terrorist consented. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility, Informal Op. 1320 (1975) took the rationale of Opinion 337 to one of its logical ends and opined that
a lawyer's investigator was under a similar constraint. The original opinion acknowledged that much
secret tape recording violates no law. The rationale of the opinion is quite unclear but appears to be based
on a notion that the public mistakenly thinks that secret tape recording is always illegal and therefore that
taping by a lawyer would be thought illegal. The opinion is criticized in Abramovsky, Surreptitious Recording
of Witnesses in Criminal Cases: A Quest for Truth or a Violation of Law and Ethics?, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1982).
For another view, see Finman & Schneyer, supra note 59, at 116-17 (Opinion 337 may be based on notion
that, unless lawyer indicates otherwise, any person wold assume that no tape recording is being made;
secret tape recording without consent is arguably the kind of "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion" proscribed in MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR 1-102(A)(4)).
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they are actually widely observed. Or worse, they might be routinely ignored by
some lawyers and adhered to by others. 62 In the end, the "ethical" approach of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York fails because it is an unaccept-
able attempt to deal rationally and realistically with the problem. 63
Lawyer fraud in asserting claims for fee awards under fee shifting need detain
us only briefly. It will surprise no one to learn that lawyer chicanery, particularly
when coupled with making false or misleading statements to a court, is pro-
scribed.64 What is more problematical is whether such patent violations-and the
less patent violations involved in other fee-shifting abuses by lawyers-are effec-
tively controlled by the mechanisms of lawyer discipline.
VI
"ETHICAL" CONTROLS
Because of peculiarities in the traditions and perhaps the imaginations of
bodies that concern themselves with lawyer behavior, lawyer controls tend to be
referred to as "ethical" controls. "Ethical" is employed not in the sense of ethics or
moral philosophy but in the specialized sense that the formal sanctions for viola-
tion of ethical prescriptions are to be found within the arsenal of professional disci-
pline.6 5 In this sense, to what extent can a public that is interested in the success of
fee-shifting schemes be assured that lawyer discipline will effectively sanction those
abuses of fee shifting that are violations of mandatory professional norms?
Unhappily, little reason exists to be optimistic that the lawyer discipline pro-
cess can effectively sanction lawyer abuses of fee-shifting schemes. Consider, first,
Prandini-sweetheart deals which involve excessive payments to the plaintiff's
lawyer in return for the lawyer's undertaking to sell the settlement to the plaintiff.
Unless the defendant has miscalculated, the sweetheart deal is a net advantage to
defendant. Thus, effective enforcement is thwarted because the defendant, who is
in the best position to detect and complain about the plaintiff's lawyer's conflict of
interest, is the party who created the problem and seeks to profit from it. The real
62. The illogic of prohibiting lawyers from taking steps for clients that clients were legally entitled to
take for themselves led to a major revision in an interim draft of the ABA Model Rules having to do with
unilateral mistakes by an opposing party. See Hazard, The Lawyer's Obhation to Be Trustworthy When Dealing
with Opposing Partes, 33 S.C.L. REV. 181, 194 n.46 (1981).
63. The conclusion of the ethics committee is, however, supportable on very different grounds. See
infra text accompanying notes 99-113.
64. MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR I-102(A)(4), 7-102(A)(3)-(6); see 1983 MODEL RULES, supra note
6, Rule 3.3(a)(1). Detected false statements in support of a request for fees are, understandably, treated
with severity. E.g., In re Wolk, 82 N.J. 326, 413 A.2d 317 (1980) (disbarment for fraudulent misstatement
to federal court in fee application statement).
65. This reflects a fading mindset. The new ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for example, are
explicit in their recognition that a great mass of applicable law applies to a lawyer's work beyond the rules
of professional conduct. The mindset described here, however, still characterizes much of the work of bar
ethics committees. A standard limit on their powers is that they may not consider questions of "law." See
Opinions of the ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics 8, Rule 1 (1967) (Rules of Procedure of the Committee
on Professional Ethics). The obvious implication is that their interpretations of professional norms, which
is the only grist upon which their mill is permitted to grind, are not about "law." Of course, this is not so,
and its falsity is occasionally implied in ethics opinions that state that lawyers may be formally disciplined
for violation of mandatory professional rules. Mandatory rules are enforceable by legal sanctions through
the process of lawyer discipline.
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victims of a sweetheart deal are the plaintiffs whose lawyers are bought off by the
defendants, but they are in the worst position to detect the fraud because of an
inability to understand, for lack of effective legal advice, that their part of the
settlement is heavily undervalued. If a disgruntled client did complain to a lawyer
discipline board, it is extremely unlikely that the board, with its typically heavy
caseload and overburdened staff, would place a high priority on litigating (possibly
relitigating) the complex issue of the fairness of the settlement and the fee given to
the complaining party's lawyer.
With Prandzi-extortion offers, the prospects for effective disciplinary response
seem even more remote. First, it is debatable whether the defense lawyer's partici-
pation in the offer is a violation of professional rules.66 Second, an examination of
actual situations reveals that defense lawyers are usually establishment lawyers
and that establishment lawyers are very rarely brought before lawyer disciplinary
agencies. 67 Third, the Prandhzi-extortion arrangement will often be accompanied
by an explicit agreement that the plaintiffs lawyer will accept a low fee or waive a
fee altogether.68 Disciplinary agencies would probably regard a plaintiff's lawyer's
complaint as the sour grapes afterthoughts of a lawyer who regretted an improvi-
dent agreement.
At the most fundamental level, lawyer disciplinary boards are very inactive on
the question of lawyers' fee-charging practices. Despite the fact that many client
complaints involve fee practices, 69 disciplinary agencies bring few actions based on
the professional rules relating to fees. 70 The discipline that is meted out for fee-
related offenses is typically found in the context of a multiple-count charge in
which the fee overcharge seems lost in a crush of other flagrant offenses 7 1 or in a
situation where the overcharge is clumsily done, hopelessly large, or patently
illegal. 72 Beyond these exotica, the fee policing process seems to lack both subtlety
and enthusiasm.
The failure of the lawyer disciplinary system to impose suitable constraints on
lawyers' fee-charging practices can be explained on different grounds. It can be
understood by those so convinced as additional proof of the conspiracy of the few
against the many.73 This failure might furnish one more illustration of what hap-
pens when agencies that draft and enforce rules are closely aligned with and con-
66. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
67. Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Proprety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 244 (1968).
68. See supra text accompanying note 39.
69. E.g., Miller, Why Crooked Lawyers Go Free, READER'S DIG., Sept. 1979, at 47, 52.
70. See, e.g., Marks & Cathcart, Disciplie Within the Legal Profession. Is It SelfRegulation?, 1974 U. ILL.
L.F. 193, 213-14 (disciplinary agencies tend to regard all client complaints about fees, except for those
charging fraud and overreaching, as outside the jurisdiction of the agency); Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers,
Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND RESEARCH J. 917, 1012.
71. Eg., In re Finch v. State Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 659, 621 P.2d 253, 170 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1981); In re
Marine, 82 Wis. 2d 602, 264 N.W.2d 285 (1978).
72. Florida Bar v. Samaha, 407 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1981) (illegal fee); Peopleexrel. Cortez v. Calvert, 200
Colo. 157, 617 P.2d 797, 800 (1980) (excessive and illegal fee charged to client A to advance adverse
interests of client B). See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R.4TH 133 (1982).
73. E.g., Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REv. 639 (1981).
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trolled by lawyers, the trade group that purportedly is being regulated. 74 Free
market ideology might be another explanation for a lack of disciplinary activity.
Fee charging takes place in a great variety of ways and under many different indi-
vidual arrangements between lawyer and client. Fee charges, for the most part,
are regulated by market mechanisms-no doubt quite imperfectly because of low
consumer levels of information, because of restrictions on the number of service
providers, and, perhaps most importantly, because of apparent noncomparability
of the service provided. Yet, despite market imperfections, there is at least the
reason of dominant social view to leave most questions of pricing to the market.
Even if a disciplinary agency are disposed to pursue questions of fee
overcharging vigorously, it would face the task of assigning a range of permissible
values to fee charges that depend, legitimately, upon a long list of unweighted
factors.75 The difficulty of making a multifarious determination of propriety is
compounded further by questions of mens rea. The mens rea factor has not
received adequate examination, and cannot here, but it seems clear that a stan-
dard of "guilty mind" is applied in bar disciplinary agencies and courts. Because
of the highly stigmatizing nature of discipline, 76 agencies are reluctant to impose
sanctions unless they can be convinced that the lawyer's offense was the product of
a subjective predisposition to act in antisocial ways. Consequently, one problem
with finding this subjective antisocial predisposition when a lawyer charges a high
fee is that greed, in some measure, is not widely regarded as a wrong in our society;
indeed many think that a greedy motive or a similarly self-centered mechanism is
the engine that drives the economy. 7 7 Agencies are left with a preposterously com-
pounded standard like "greedy greed" 78 that the prosecutor will find difficult to
satisfy.
The specific problem in fee shifting is not so much the size of the fee as the
suspicion that the lawyer's conduct in the representation was influenced by an
74. E.g., Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977);
Wolfram, Barriers to Efective Public Partctpation in Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619
(1978). For an excellent survey and analysis of the values and conflicts implicit in self-regulation by the
legal profession, see Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers. A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L.
REV. 689 (1981).
75. MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR 2-106(B) (nonexhaustive list of eight factors); 1983 MODEL
RULES, supra note 6, 1.5(a) (same).
76. E.g., Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 147 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
77. E.g., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88-115 (1981) (ch. 4: "The Ethical and Political
Basis of Wealth Maximization"). Greed is, perhaps, a sloppy and argumentative way of saying something
that can be more neutrally expressed, such as "preferences... backed up by a willingness [and ability?] to
pay." Id at 87.
78. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 6, DR 2-106(A) ("A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement
for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee."); id. DR 2-106(B) ("A fee is clearly excessive when,
after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction
that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee."); see also CALIF. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 2-
107(A) ("A member of the State Bar shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or
unconscionable fee."); id. Rule 2-107(B) ("A fee is unconscionable when it is so exorbitant and wholly
disproportionate to the services performed as to shock the conscience of lawyers of ordinary prudence
practicing in the same community."); Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, Rule 1.4(d), in 5 OKLA.
STAT. ch. 1, app. I-A (Supp. 1982) ("Controversies as to the amount of fees shall not be considered a basis
for charges in a disciplinary proceeding unless it is made to appear that the amount demanded is extor-
tionate or fraudulent.").
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impermissible conflict of interest that led the lawyer to take steps in the representa-
tion for reasons other than the best interests of the client. Here again, supervision
of the lawyer's work would require a meticulous inquiry into a long and largely
unverifiable course of conduct and would involve a quite unsatisfactory inquiry
into the lawyer's motivations. These problems of proof make it highly unlikely
that a lawyer disciplinary agency could operate very effectively in this area. More-
over, even if an agency could operate effectively, its inquiry could create an
unseemly conflict with the courts involved in fee shifting.
The invocation of professional standards to restrain inappropriate lawyer
behavior caused by fee-shifting arrangements is not limited to those adjudications
by lawyer disciplinary agencies. Several courts have borrowed, for ill or for good,
the fee-setting standards of the Code of Professional Responsibility as guides to
judicial decisions concerning the size of fees. 7 9 Whatever standard is employed, a
common feature of all fee-shifting schemes is that the court in which the substan-
tive conflict concerning the rights and liabilities of the lawyers' clients is resolved is
the same tribunal that will set the size of the shifted fee if the parties do not settle
the fee question. Typically, but not inevitably, as in some conflict-of-interest situa-
tions, the only party aggrieved by the size of a shifted fee is the party paying the
fee or the party out of whose settlement fund the fee will first be taken. Any
aggrieved party will naturally and necessarily first file a protest with the court that
awarded the fee and seek a reduction or disallowance of the award. Then, most
likely, a lawyer disciplinary agency will be asked to adjudicate the legitimacy of
the lawyer's shifted fee only after a court has had an opportunity to assess the
strength of any objections to the fee. The complaint, in effect, will attempt to
place the lawyer disciplinary agency in the position of second-guessing the sound-
ness of the original court's decision. The doctrine of collateral estoppel will not
technically apply because the disciplinary prosecutor will not have been a party to
the judicial fee dispute. 80 But considerations of efficiency and economy still argue
against a very extended jurisdiction to reexamine fee-shifting orders. Moreover,
for one branch of the judicial system to sit in judgment on another branch outside
the normal schemes for appellate review of orders81 seems both untidy and need-
lessly duplicative. If anything, there will be a higher burden of proof favoring the
lawyer in the disciplinary proceedings8 2 so that optimism about systematically
79. The leading case is Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1979). See also Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1067-68 (D.D.C. 1976), afd sub nom. Parker v.
California, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Key v. Cascade Packing Co., 19 Wash. App. 579, 585, 576 P.2d
929, 933 (1978); Herro, McAndrews & Porter v. Gerhardt, 62 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 214 N.W.2d 401, 404
(1974).
80. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34(3) (1982).
81. All state lawyers' discpline systems operate through mechanisms that provide for review in the
state's judicial system, which is the same system that might have awarded the fee now challenged. The
extreme case would be an attempt in a bar disciplinary proceeding to discipline a lawyer because of a fee
award sustained by the state's highest court.
82. The customary burden of proof in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding requires proof of a violation
by "clear and convincing" evidence. Comm. on Professional Ethics v. Bitter, 279 N.W.2d 521, 522 (Iowa
1979); In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 419, 177 A.2d 721, 730 (1961); In re Marcus, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 576, 320
N.W.2d 806, 815 (1982) ("clear and satisfactory evidence"). At least one jurisdiction employs the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard that is usually reserved for criminal proceedings. Rules and Regulations for
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more favorable outcomes is ill-founded.
VII
CREATING PROPER INCENTIVES
Is there a better way, or will the system of fee shifting have to rely on the
mercies of each individual lawyer's variant sense of personal integrity? Do the
poor prospects for effective disciplinary enforcement mean that lawyers are beyond
control in fee-shifting settings? With respect to the two Prandini* problems, it is
likely that ways can be found to deal with lawyer abuses of fee shifting. A solution
can best be accomplished by structuring the procedures for fee shifting in ways
that create incentives for appropriate lawyer behavior and provide nondisciplinary
sanctions for inappropriate lawyer conduct.
Consider, first, the Prandini -sweetheart situation. The decision itself offered one
solution-a ban on any discussion of the fee to be paid to the successful party's
lawyer until the court had approved the settlement.8 3 Will this procedural solu-
tion work? Are its costs too high?
One of the commonly asserted objections to the Prandini-sweetheart solution is
that it ignores the defendant's interest in knowing its total financial exposure in the
event of settlement.8 4 The defendant, not knowing the size of the fee to be
awarded to the prevailing party's lawyer, is in a poor position to assess its total
economic exposure. Indeed, some fear that this uncertainty will result in far fewer
settlements, thus unduly prolonging litigation and imposing unwanted burdens on
crowded court dockets. 8 5  Undeniably, the Prandini two-step settlement require-
ment leaves the defendant in the dark about total cost until the segregated ques-
tion of fees is resolved. It is even theoretically possible that no subsequent fee
settlement will be reached, resulting in extended litigation concerning the question
of fees despite settlement of the underlying claim of the lawyer's client.
While this objection is not without substance, it can readily be overstated. The
defendant typically will have some notion of the probable size of the court's award
of attorney fees. In class actions, the court's own records might be available and
might contain information about the number of hours worked by the opposing
lawyer.86 Even in the absence of these records, the defendant's own expenditures
the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, Rule 4-221(e), 241 Ga. 643, 760 (1978).
The customary standard in civil actions is the "preponderance" of the evidence standard. F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6, at 243 (2d ed. 1977). A substantial minority of courts apply this lesser
standard in lawyer disicpline cases. E.g., In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771, 776-77 (Alaska 1978); In re
McWhorter, 407 Mich. 278, 290, 284 N.W.2d 472, 478 (1979).
83. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977); see also supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
84. E.g., A. MILLER, supra note 33, at 222-23. The same objection cannot be made in shareholder
derivative actions and similar class action types of litigation where the lawyer fee is paid out of a settlement
fund, because the defendant's complete exposure is defined by the settlement figure. See PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 34, § 7.07, comment c at 413.
85. A. MILLER, supra note 33.
86. In class actions, courts that follow the recommendations of the Manual on Complex Litigation
will have required the plaintiffs lawyer to submit periodic reports of hours worked. See MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.47(1) (5th ed. 1982). These reports are to be under seal, presumably to avoid
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for legal fees will be some measure of the probable magnitude of the opposing
lawyer's fee claim. The reported decisions on lawyer fees are now sufficiently
numerous that some guidance on probable judicial reaction to requests for fee
awards can be gained. No right to jury trial exists on the question of the size of a
fee award, and thus reported judicial decisions give a much surer guide.8 7 Natu-
rally, some part of the fee award is still indeterminate because of the large discre-
tion that trial courts possess. Yet, most well-advised defendants will be able to
determine the fairly narrow range within which a fee award will fall.
Another possible objection to the Prandini prohibition against presettlement fee
discussions is that only ethical lawyers will abide by it. It still remains in defend-
ants' interest to attempt to buy out opposing lawyers, and some plaintiffs' lawyers
will perceive it as similarly in their interest to cooperate. The fear remains that
strong economic incentives on both sides will predictably lead to collusive pre-
settlement discussions despite the court ban.8 8 This consequence could follow if
the Prandini solution is simply announced as a rule of professional conduct and its
enforcement is left to lawyer disciplinary agencies. Enforcement would be difficult
because the collusion would take the form of veiled communications, carefully
designed to avoid creating concrete evidence of a violation of an ethical rule. Any
conspirator tempted to blow the whistle must be aware that the evidence is equiv-
ocal and likely to be hotly contested. Also, the potential whistle-blower must
realize that disclosure is likely to encourage the accused lawyer to counterattack.
Not all lawyers have the kind of status and reputation which can resist and make
hollow the threat of a retaliatory disciplinary charge. The whistle-blower also may
confront the opposing lawyer in other litigation in which retaliatory moves could
redound to the disadvantage of the whistle-blowing lawyer and his or her clients.
If these and like constraints mean that only lawyers who internalize the Prandini
standard, along with their clients, will be disadvantaged by the Prandini rule, then
indeed the rule seems objectionable.
A short and inexpensive procedure, however, is available to make the Prandni"
prohibition against presettlement fee discussions more effective. Every judge
presented with a first-stage Prandini settlement for approval should require that
each lawyer involved in the settlement negotiations or any lawyer who later
receives a part of the fee award file an affidavit describing in some detail the
nature of the negotiations. The lawyer should be required to reveal the extent, if
any, of discussions of fees, no matter how veiled. Many lawyers who might not
hesitate to violate judicially stated requirements will quail at the necessity of
denying under oath that they engaged in any offensive conduct. A lawyer who
knows that an adversary can later demonstrate the falsity of his or her affidavit
probably will regard that threat as too potentially destructive to risk the offensive
conduct in the first place. Such a certification of compliance with a Prandini -like
divulgence of the plaintiffs' lawyers' work product. It seems desirable and consistent with this objective for
the defendant to be permitted access to a summary of the records late in the initial settlement discussions.
87. The trial judge's findings of fact in support of a fee award are seldom disturbed on appeal. See
generally 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.03[1], at 2630 n.26 (2d ed. 1982).
88. See A. Miller, supra note 33, at 222 n.39 (survey of judges and lawyers indicates concern that
Prandini might be impossible to enforce due to collusive avoidance of it).
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rule outlawing presettlement fee discussions has been proposed for inclusion in the
American Law Institute's (ALI) recommendations for reform of shareholder deriv-
ative actions. 89
If desirable for derivative actions, is the certificate of nonnegotiation of fees also
desirable for all actions in which fee shifting is provided? Is the Prandim'-sweetheart
abuse limited only or mainly to class actions such as derivative suits? A Prandtni-
type certification procedure can be readily worked into the established procedural
requirements for class actions and derivative suits because judicial approval is
required before any of these cases can be dismissed or settled.90 Judicial approval,
however, rarely is required for nonclass action suits and then is limited to represen-
tational suits such as actions on behalf of minors when special judicial solicitude is
thought appropriate.9' Reasonable arguments can be made for the view that
Prandini -sweetheart problems are largely limited to representational actions such
as class actions and derivative suits. Representational suits are peculiar in that the
lawyer has an unusually high degree of control over the disposition of the action.
This power is justified by the absence, in a typical class action, of a significant
interest on the part of any class member. But it is also a potential flaw in the
design because, as discussed above,92 the absence of client control leaves the lawyer
for the class free from any effective oversight. In contrast, it might be argued that
in nonclass action suits there is significantly less need for substitution of judicial
control. In these suits, the individual client can be relied upon to monitor the
quality of his or her lawyer's representation, including those occasions when the
lawyer recommends inadequate settlements for the client in return for a high fee
shift.
Yet, empirical studies in nonrepresentational litigation give little assurance
that client control is actually effective in many types of suits in which fee-shifting is
found.93 For reasons developed by other papers in this symposium, the tendency is
for many fee shifting schemes to operate primarily in favor of the litigational
"untermensch"-persons whose lack of resources would normally bar them from
court. 94 These persons typically have little prior experience with lawyers and
probably are sufficiently risk-averse to readily follow a lawyer's strong recommen-
dation to accept a settlement. By definition, these clients will lack the resources
and mobility to seek out a second opinion on the quality of their lawyers' advice.
Consequently, one may conclude that judicial approval of settlements-together
with an enhanced Prandim-like separation of settlement and fee negotiations such
as tentatively proposed by the ALI study 95-should be applied in all fee shifting
situations including those quite beyond class and other representational actions.
89. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 34 at § 7.07(b) (i)-(iii) (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1982).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (class actions generally); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (derivative actions).
91. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 3500(b) (West 1981) (court approval required for validation of settle-
ment of minor's claim); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1207 (McKinney Supp. 1982) (same).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
93. Supra note 12.
94. Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shtiing, LAv & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 139.
95. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 34; see also text accompanying note 89
supra.
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At the least, incremental enactment of fee shifting in new areas should be under-
taken only after consideration of the possible special utility of a requirement of
judicial approval of settlements.
Prandzni-extortion offers present a number of similarities and differences that
require further attention. The prohibition in Prandini against presettlement discus-
sions would limit but not eliminate the possible extortion problem. Under
Prandtz, the defendant presumably still has the opportunity, either directly or
through defendant's lawyer, to make as part of the offer-but refuse to discuss-an
express condition of waiver of plaintiffs entitlement to lawyers' fees. It is impor-
tant to note that this move would not be available under the extended version of
Prandnti contained in the ALI proposal because the proposed language expressly
outlaws "any agreement, negotiation or discussion concerning allowable plaintiffs
fees or expenses with an opposing party in the action." '96 The agreement itself,
absent any discussion or negotiation, is proscribed. Unquestionably, once the
"substantive" portion of the settlement offer is approved by the court, the leverage
pressure is removed and nothing stands in the way of an arm's length negotiation
between plaintiffs lawyer and the defense about the size of the lawyer's fee.
Prandini cum ALI makes sense. Its costs, as discussed above, 97 are tolerable and
appropriate ones.
Prandnz, however, is not universally accepted, and the ALI proposals are
wending their way slowly through the cumbersome machinery of numerous com-
mittees and annual ALI meetings. There is little prospect that these proposals will
be finally approved for some time. Pending the enactment of these proposals into
law, is there any better approach for dealing with Prandinzh-extortion offers than
that offered by the ethics committee of the Bar of the City of New York?9 8
Without regard to the language of the professional codes, three straightforward
reasons exist for objecting to the conduct of a defense lawyer in making a Prandini-
extortion offer. First, such conduct is extortionate and extortion is wrongful duress
impermissible to both lawyers and nonlawyers.99 Second, lawyers and nonlawyers
alike are prohibited by law from creating a conflict of interest that carries a sub-
stantial risk of harming the interests of the represented opponent.10 0 Third,
Prandzni'-extortion agreements conflict with evident purposes of the fee-award stat-
utes, which otherwise would allow fees, and thus these agreements should not be
enforced because they offend public policy. 10 1 In short, the position of the New
96. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 34, at § 7.07(b) (first sentence).
97. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
99. Cf Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261 (Fla.) (lawyer who tried to persuade marina developer to
hire him for legal services through use of threats is guilty of felony extortion), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 874
(1980); Livermore, Lawyer Extorton, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 403 (1978).
100. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958) ("A person, without privilege,
should refrain from causing an agent to violate a duty to a third party.").
101. The force of this third consideration depends upon the particular language, history, and purpose
of the fee-shifting statute involved. For example, the purpose of the civil rights fee-shifting arrangement is,
in major part, to encourage lawyers to bring such suits and thus to deter substantive violations of the civil
rights acts. In that light, Prandzt'-extortion offers plainly conflict with the policy of the civil rights laws.
See Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denzed 103 S. Ct. 300 (1982).
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York City Bar prohibiting defense lawyers from participating in Prandn' -extortion
offers is correct, but for different and much more widely sweeping reasons than
there suggested. These three reasons-which present criminal, fiduciary, and stat-
utory policy perspectives on the same problem-can best be understood in the
context of the quandaries confronting a plaintiff's lawyer who meets a Prandni-
extortion offer head-on.
Consider a recent housing discrimination case in which the plaintiffs primarily
sought injunctive relief against a municipality. 10 2 After months of motions, dis-
covery, and other preliminary skirmishes, all requiring substantial expenditures of
lawyer time, the plaintiffs were presented with an offer by the defendants. The
offer, if accepted, would have conceded the objectives of the plaintiffs' suit at a
time when financing and housing subsidies were still available. Delay could have
jeopardized everything because even success at an eventual trial might have found
the then-available financing arrangements so altered that the relief accorded
would be a mere fraction of that offered by the proposed settlement. The only
hitch was the Prandtini-extortion condition: plaintiffs' lawyers must agree to waive
all of their fee. What are the options?
First, most obviously, motivation to receive a fee for already extensive and
uncompensated legal services might lead the plaintiffs' lawyers to urge the plain-
tiffs to reject the settlement offer. Clearly this action is unethical because the set-
tlement is in the best interests of the clients and the lawyers' self-interested advice
would be seriously defective. 10 3  Nonetheless, by attaching the Prandni'-extortion
condition to the offer, a defendant clearly increases the risk that a settlement very
favorable to the plaintiffs will be rejected because of defective advice from lawyers
who succumb to the pressure of a possible fee shift that could occur if relief is
obtained at trial.
Second, the lawyers could collectively sigh and accept the deprivation of a fee
without further protest or with only the symbolic protest of a complaint to a pro-
fessional disciplinary agency. Such resignation seemingly would have the inevi-
table effect of limiting lawyers' economic ability to accept civil rights cases in the
future. This result, given the statutory policy clearly expressed in the Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fee Awards Act,'0 4 would be quite dysfunctional to the objectives of
102. Chattanooga Branch of the NAACP v. City of Chattanooga, Nos. 82-5016/5013 (6th Cir. 1982)
(appeal dismissed). I am indebted to my fellow Duke conferee E. Richard Larson for the reference to the
Chattanooga NAACP problem.
103. Difficult and subtle issues lurk here. For example, the lawyers might believe-"objectively"-
that victory in the case would be truly Pyrrhic as far as the plaintiff class is concerned, because the Prandin
device would deprive its members of needed representation in the future. Under these facts, it is arguable
that the lawyers, in good faith, could urge rejection of the settlement. But this is not entirely clear as
evidenced by two reasons from the Chattanooga NAACP case. The lawyers for the plaintiffs were supported,
in part, by advocacy organizations which derive financial support from contributions, and thus the impact
on them of a Prandim'-extortion condition was perhaps less than that which would be visited on an indi-
vidual lawyer. Second, the broad scope of the relief that the settlement afforded the plaintiff class made
any cost-benefit calculation tilt rather strongly in favor of accepting the settlement. For a thoughtful
discussion of some of the lawyer-class difficulties that settlement offers can entail, see Rhode, supra note 39,
at 1204-15, 1237.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. 1977).
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encouraging full and vigorous representation in civil rights suits and of providing
economic deterrence to civil rights violators.
Third, beyond these unacceptable or unfortunate results lie possible moves by
the class lawyers to obtain advance judicial protection. Suppose that the plaintiffs'
lawyers invoke the protection of the trial court. The theory behind this move is to
obtain the protection of a Prandini order from the trial court directing the
defendant to excise the fee-frustrating condition from the settlement offer and to
avoid any fee discussions during negotiations. But this clearly is a dangerous
gambit. If the court grants the requested relief t0 5 the defendant in most instances
is perfectly free to walk away from the settlement-to the obvious detriment of the
plaintiff class. Indeed, this power of defendants to insist upon fee-waiver condi-
tions depends heavily on the take-it-or-leave-it power that withdrawal of the settle-
ment offer portends. Again, the threat to the plaintiff class' interest in achieving
the settlement seems to militate against such a move by the plaintiff's lawyer.
Fourth, plaintiffs' lawyers can consider a bit of hardball in return. One pos-
sible gambit runs along the following lines. The settlement offer is accepted by the
class and their lawyers with the lawyers privately memorializing their pain and
outrage at being euchred into a fee waiver by the force of the leverage applied by
the defendant. The class' interests are protected by entry of a judgment locking
the defendant into a res judicata-protected final judgment. When this protection
is assured, the disenchanted lawyer can take one of several possible moves to attack
the fee-waiver condition of the settlement and obtain an adequate award. This
can be done, most obviously, by either a postjudgment motion for fees in the same
court that entered the judgment on the settlement on a theory that is briefly out-
lined below. This possible strategy for springing out of the trap set by the
defendant is fraught with uncertainty.
The postjudgment motion strategy is derived from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Secuny. 106 The Court there
held that a postjudgment motion for attorney fees is not governed by the ten-day
time limitation of the federal procedural rules governing motions for altering or
amending a judgment. 0 7 Unhappily, however, the majority refused to reveal
what other possible time limitations may apply' 018 or whether general equitable
standards of fairness and avoidance of prejudice to the defendant are the only
limitations. 0 9 The obvious reason for the class' lawyer to wait is to permit the ten-
day time limits for direct attack upon the judgment to expire before raising the
question of fees.' 10 Expiration of the ten-day period makes it less likely that the
105. In the actual case, the trial court refused to grant the requested Prandi order for undisclosed
reasons. The court did not, however, formally rule on the motion. See Brief for Appellants (Plaintiffs) at 7,
Chattanooga Branch of the NAACP v. City of Chattanooga, Nos. 82-5016/5013 (6th Cir. 1982). The Sixth
Circuit had neither adopted nor rejected Prandini. Also, this case is factually distinguishable from Prandtin
in that a "buy out" of the plaintiffs' lawyers was not threatened.
106. 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
107. Id. at 450-54; see FED. R. CiV. P. 59(e).
108. Justice Blackmun complained in a concurring opinion about the wastefully incremental
approach of the majority. 455 U.S. at 455-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
109. See id.
110. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b), 59(e).
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defendant could reopen the judgment to the detriment of the client.II A firmer
basis for protection takes the form of an express condition in the lawyer's request
for relief to the effect that the lawyer will abandon the request if the client's settle-
ment would be upset by grant of the requested relief.
The substantive thrust of the lawyers' motion to set aside the fee waiver and to
award fees as provided in the fee-shifting statute rests upon the ground that the
fee-waiver provision of the agreement is void because it is contrary to public
policy. " 2 Under the circumstances of the housing discrimination case, plainly, the
question of the validity of a purported contractual waiver of a federal statutory
right to a fee is decided exclusively under federal standards.' 3 Because federal
law providing for an award of attorney fees in civil rights cases is so plainly frus-
trated by Prandhzi-extortion offers, coerced waivers of this kind should not be
upheld.
Analytically, the lawyer's postsettlement request for fees is founded directly
upon the fee-shifting statute. Thus, the general absence of a tort action for
duress' 14 is irrelevant. The lawyer's earlier assent to waive the fee shift enters the
case as a defense by the defendant to the claim for fees. The lawyer's argument is
that the assent was coerced and that, as a result, the fee waiver should be an inef-
fective barrier to a fee request. The plaintiffs lawyer's agreement to the Prandini-
extortion fee condition, while planning all along to attack it later, should not con-
stitute an estoppel. On the whole, courts have been unreceptive to such estoppel
claims when a strong argument is made for voiding a contractual term on public
policy grounds." 5 Plainly, no superior access to the facts or legal basis for invali-
dating the fee-waiver condition exists, and the defendant should have looked only
to its defense lawyer for advice on the validity of the waiver.
The unenforceability of promises on the ground of public policy is a large topic
which this article cannot examine in satisfactory detail."16 Illustrative of the
approach that might be taken in Prandzi-extortion situations is the recent decision
of the Third Circuit in Shadis v. Beal, 17 which invalidated a very similar contrac-
tual provision. The court there struck down on public policy grounds a provision
of a contract between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and a legal services
11. After expiration of the ten-day period following entry of a judgment, the federal rules permit
judgments to be set aside only on narrow grounds. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60. See generally, 6A J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.02 (2d ed. 1983); 7 id. 60.22121, at 60-182 to 184.
112. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981): "A promise or other term
of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable
or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the
enforcement of such terms." See also, e.g., A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 1375 (1962 & C. Kaufman Supp.
1982); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 5.1-.9 (1982).
113. See Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 828 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342
U.S. 359 (1952) (validity of release of liability under Federal Employers Liability Act governed by federal
common law).
114. See generall E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, § 4.9, at 233-34 n.5 (1982). Voiding the fee-waiver
promise on the ground of economic duress would be an alternative approach to the "public policy" ground
advanced here. Duress as a defense to a contractual claim is well recognized. Id. at § 4.9.
115. E.g., Inter-Continental Promotions v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 441 F.2d 1356, 1360-61
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971).
116. For general treatment, see, e.g., authorities cited supra note 112.
117. 685 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 300 (1982).
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organization under which the organization agreed not to request legal fees in
actions against the state in return for basic funding of its operations. The court
refused to permit the state "to vitiate by contract a significant portion of the power
and duty which Congress has granted to the judiciary as an essential tool in the
scheme of civil rights enforcement." " A private contract to waive fees in Prandm'-
extortion circumstances seems equally contrary to the public policy goals of
Congress.
A question raised by this analysis is whether voiding the fee-waiver clause of
the settlement contract should bring down the entire settlement, including the por-
tion of the settlement favorable to the client of the lawyer victimized by the
Prandint -extortion fee waiver. The courts' general approach is to invalidate the
entire contract only when the offending clause is an integral part of the contract
and its excision makes the remainder of the contract impossible or seriously diffi-
cult to perform.11 9 This approach normally leaves the substantive part of the set-
tlement entirely unaffected by a determination that the Prandim'-extortion fee
waiver is invalid. Doctrinally, the fee award is treated as independent from the
merits for several purposes, such as appeal. 120 Practically, it is inconsequential
that the defendant might claim that the fee waiver was a "but for" portion of the
settlement offer. Defendant's intent to gain a significant advantage by means of
the forbidden contractual term plays no part in determining its severability from
the rest of the contract which, in any event, is now embodied in a judgement.
The invalidity of the fee-waiver clause on public policy grounds is, of course,
an argument that can be made directly against the defendant. Thus, unlike the
situation that might arise under the New York City Bar ethical opinion,' 2 1 the
defendant is bound by the same legal rules as those that shackle defense counsel.
Moreover, because the fee-paying party is not legally entitled to insist on a
Prandini-extortion fee waiver, the professional rules that prohibit a lawyer from
assisting a client in performing an illegal or fraudulent act 122 or counseling a client
to disobey a court order 123 are also applicable. Much more convincingly than the
approach of the City Bar, these rules prohibit the defense lawyer's initial participa-
tion in the offer.
118. d at 831.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178-84 (1976).
120. See supra note 29.
121. See supra note 55, notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
122. MODEL CoDE,supra note 6, DR 7-102(A)(7); 1983 MODEL RULES, Supra note 6, Rule 1.2(d); e.g.,
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Weinstein, 416 So. 2d 62 (La. 1982). Somewhat more problematic is the
question whether a lawyer's advice or assistance to a client to commit a tort or a breach of contract is
sanctionable as unprofessional. See, e.g., Silver v. George, I Hawaii App. 331, 618 P.2d 1157 (1980), aft'd,
64 Hawaii 503, 644 P.2d 955 (1982) (lawyer who drafted usurious note committed per se violation of duty,
thus making him liable to nonclient payee of note). Compare Probert & Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice. Duy
Relationships Beyond Contract, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 708, 720-21 (1980) (lawyer's exposure to liability to
injured third parties is least in the case of an advised breach of contract, questionable in the case of a
contemplated tort with greater likelihood of liability if the tort is one involving intentional fraud (such as
misrepresentation), and greatest if the client's intended act is also a crime), with Schwartz, The Profession-
alim and Accountabihty of Lawfyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 671 (1978) (as a disciplinary matter, lawyers
should be prohibited from aiding clients in the commission of any tort).
123. E.g., Davis v. Goodson, 276 Ark. 337, 635 S.W.2d 226 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 798 (1983);
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298, 307 (Iowa 1976).
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LIMITS OF PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
By force of the contract doctrine invalidating settlement terms that are
opposed by strong public policy, the policies of fee-shifting arrangements can be
vindicated in ways that are straightforward and permit no evasion. Unlike leaving
manipulation of the fee-shifting statute to the uncertain vagaries of enforcement
through disciplinary agencies, the public policy approach also has the merit of
eliminating the defendant's economic motivation to engage in the tactic. As with
similar approaches taken to solve the problem of other lawyer abuses, the public
policy approach seems much more fruitful than reliance on disciplinary enforce-
ment. Professor John Leubsdorf, for example, has urged that contingency factors
in fee awards be reformed. One reason for this reform is to avoid a potential con-
flict of interest between client and lawyer that exists because of the temptation
forced upon the lawyer to attempt to maximize his or her fee by emphasizing the
weaknesses of the client's case at a time when there is a possibility of an upset of
the settlement. 124 To the extent that fee-shifting awards employ factors that invite
conflicts of interest in a significant number of cases, and to the extent that these
schemes can readily be replaced by others, it is sensible to resort to other methods
of computation that do not create lawyer-client conflicts. It is preferable to
strengthen the fee-award mechanisms rather than trust the lawyer disciplinary
agencies to perform the difficult task of attempting to identify situations in which a
lawyer has fallen prey to the tempting conflict. 12 5
VIII
CONCLUSION
Fee-shifting schemes can offer powerful incentives to lawyers to pursue their
own interests at the expense of client interests. These schemes can also be frus-
trated by manipulation. Effective client control is typically absent. Disciplinary
agencies are ill-designed to serve as surrogate clients with more effective control.
Clearly, decisions by plaintiffs and defendants about levels of expenditures on legal
fees cannot be treated as endogenous continuous variables in a model of fee
shifting with pretensions of wide applicability and great power. 126 To date, how-
ever, no account that acknowledges the independent variability of lawyer control
has proposed a decision model that fully and adequately accounts for this
problem.' 27 Nonetheless, in light of present understanding of lawyer and client
motivations, fee reformers should guard against designing fee-shifting arrange-
ments that create significantly differing interests between lawyers and clients that
124. See Leubsdorf, supra note 17, at 482-85.
125. The specific reform proposed by Professor Leubsdorf is to create set contingency bonuses for
different groupings of cases. This method would effectively remove any temptation for a lawyer in such
cases to argue the weakness of the client's case and would cure other anomalies as well. See id. at 502.
126. I nonetheless applaud Bruce Owen's much more carefully limited and refreshingly modest eco-
nomic analysis of fee shifting in this symposium. See Braeutagam, Owen & Panzar, An Economic Analyst of
Alternative Fee Shitng Systems, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984 at 173. As Mr. Owen takes pains to
point out himself, his model is limited by his inability at this point to relax assumptions about client
control over critical decisions. Mr, Owen's model at least supplies a highly suggestive beginning toward an
economic account of fee shifting. A complete understanding, however, awaits a model that takes adequate
account of lawyer motivations as an exogenous effect.
127. See R. POSNER, EcONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 434-41 (2d ed. 1977); Shavell, supra note 4.
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are exploitable either by uncontrolled fee seekers or by adversaries seeking to
exploit advantages for their own clients.
No real-life system of fee shifting can hope to remove all traces of economic
conflict between lawyer and client. Some form of these conflicts will always inhere
in the fact that a lawyer has values, beliefs, opportunities, experience, costs, and
other pressures that differ from those of the client. It seems clear, however, that
more can and should be done to protect vulnerable clients from the most ravaging
forms of lawyer disloyalty and to protect faithful lawyers from serious and dysfunc-
tional sacrifices imposed by their adversaries.
